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1. Introduction 
The economic and financial crises of the last decade have led to 
massive changes in economic, social, banking, and employment 
policies throughout the world. However, both the United States and 
the United Kingdom have generally maintained more static in 
relation to their overall status quo regarding insolvency and social 
policy, in stark contrast to the reactions of most continental European 
nations. Taken together with the sovereign debt crisis that plagued 
many continental European nations beginning in 2010, it may be 
somewhat surprising that the United Kingdom has not adjusted its 
policies to any greater degree than it has. Rather, it is continental 
Europe that has moved more or less en masse toward the lower 
common denominator of the United Kingdom, at least in terms of 
social and employment protection. In addition, many peripheral or 
less economically developed European nations have achieved some 
inadvertent legal benefits from the crises of the last decade in the 
reform or creation of more robust insolvency and corporate rescue 
systems.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the historical and 
constitutional underpinnings of the US and the UK, within the 
context of the European Union when required, in order to identify 
important differences in legal development and divergence from a 
common legal ancestry in approaches to insolvency, in particular 
corporate rescue procedures such as Chapter 11 and administration 
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under the Insolvency Act 1986, and the social policy issues related to 
it. By identifying points of divergence situated within the historical 
context in which it arose, a more detailed, path dependent 
observation may reveal deeply seated differences that can explain 
why the US and the UK have often relied upon different foundational 
philosophies in the development of legal systems in insolvency and 
social policy. While the UK and the US are often compared in a 
positive light, as being more closely aligned than other European 
nations and the UK, their differences continue to persist, despite EU 
influence, and indeed, at times, in spite of it. 
2 Comparative History of Insolvency and Corporate 
Rescue in UK and USA 
Insolvency law draws together a number of different legal areas that 
interact in a complex balancing act, one that has sometimes been 
skewed due to constitutional restrictions and other legal and policy 
related roadblocks. The complex intermingling of insolvency law 
with, in particular, the law of contract, with what one might normally 
view as the defining parameters of the American Constitution, 
contrasted with the decisions of individual state courts, illustrates 
how this area has been problematic. The United Kingdom has not 
faced similar obstacles for a number of centuries, which, while 
reducing the competing factors that might be encountered by 
legislators in this area, has not prevented a slow evolution of 
insolvency systems, as opposed to the more rapid and holistic 
changes that has historically characterised insolvency in the US.  
2.1 Divergence from a Common Past 
The Statute of Anne that was in place in the American colonies at the 
time of the American Revolution, exporting the stigma that remains 
attached to indebtedness today in the UK given the fact that one was 
“liable” to bankruptcy, rather than benefitting from it.1 This law is 
                                                 
1 S.J. Lubben, “A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause”, (2013) 64(2) 
Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, pp. 337. 
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often portrayed as the beginning of a modern, enlightened bankruptcy 
practice because it introduced the possibility of being discharged 
from debt, though exceedingly difficult and restricted only to 
traders.2 Even prior to the passing of the Statute of Anne various 
states of America had created their own ways of dealing with 
bankruptcy, with Maryland formulating the first true bankruptcy law 
on the American continent in 1638, though it tracked existing English 
law at the time. Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts 
followed suit with their own versions, all of which varied in 
description, scope, and purpose. Between 1755 and 1770 New York 
expanded a system for the release of impoverished debtors from 
prison to include the ability to bind holdout creditors to a workout 
agreed by a majority of creditors. Thus, the US began to diverge from 
the norms of British bankruptcy law even prior to the Revolution, 
developing a number of procedures that were often labelled as 
something else and private bills that eventually came together to 
provide an early system of bankruptcy relief. While it relied heavily 
on English practice in the earliest days, the tendency of the colonial 
law makers were to concentrate on the plight of imprisoned debtors 
rather than the punishment of them.3  
In the early 1770s, the US continued to attempt to provide better 
and greater relief via bankruptcy provisions. One of the major 
issues encountered by colonial legislators was the requirement 
that any commercial legislation must obtain approval of 
Britain’s Privy Council. In 1771, New York attempted to further 
expand their system relating to the release of imprisoned debtors 
to also protect the debtor’s property acquired following release 
from prison, but Britain refused to approve it.4 Thus not only 
did the Revolution successfully separate the American nation 
from the patriarchy of English rule, it freed their ability to 
legislate to create systems suited to the social, cultural, and 
economic circumstances that characterised the pioneering spirit 
                                                 
2 Ibid., pp. 336-337. 
3 Ibid., pp. 338-339. 
4 Ibid., p. 339. 
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of the new American nation. Following the American 
Revolution, the first constitutional document, the Articles of 
Confederation, failed to provide for a national bankruptcy law, 
thus the states had to continue to legislate in this area without 
any continuity that might have been possible with some federal 
coordination.5  
The US Constitution provided the framework for the power 
relationship between the States and the Federal Government. Due to 
competing views on what level of power the federal government 
should wield over the states, the Federal Government was given 
enumerated powers that limited its competences to govern the states.6 
These enumerated powers included a Bankruptcy Clause, which gave  
the federal government the apparent power to enact “uniform laws on 
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.”7 This 
should have heralded the commencement of a senatorial drafting of a 
unifying bankruptcy act that would have consolidated and simplified 
bankruptcy throughout the entire nation. However, such was not to be 
for nearly two centuries due to fundamental differences in 
governance philosophies between Federalists and Republicans, the 
competing political parties of the day.8 Thus, the states remained free 
to enact the insolvency laws they deemed appropriate and the Federal 
Government was acquiescent, leaving individual states responsible 
for providing the means to resolve financial distress despite the 
apparent constitutional power of the Bankruptcy Clause,9 with only a 
few largely failed  interventions by the Federal Government.10    
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 340. 
6 M.H. Redish, “Doing it with Mirror: New York v United States and Constitutional 
Limitations of Federal Power to Require State Legislation”, (1993-1994) 21 
Hastings Const LQ 593, pp. 594-596. 
7 US Constitution, article I paragraph 8 clause 4. 
8 R. Sylla, R.E. Wright and D.J. Cowen, “Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: 
Crisis Management during the US Financial Panic of 1792”, (2009) 83 Business 
History Review, pp. 62-63.  
9 Lubben, above note 1, 341-342. 
10 The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Act of Apr 4, 1800, ch 19, 2 Stat 19 (repealed 
1803); The Bankruptcy Act of 1841, Act of Aug 19, 1841, ch 5 Stat 440 (repealed 
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In 1874, a predecessor of the debtor in possession provision of 
Chapter 11 was introduced in a composition procedure that formed a 
part of massive reforms made to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.11 The 
composition provision allowed a debtor to remain in possession of 
his property if a sufficient number of creditors accepted the 
composition proposal, which would then be binding on all unsecured 
creditors, while those creditors who dissented were paid according to 
a “best interests” test based on liquidation outcomes. While this law 
lasted longer than those attempts made previously by the federal 
government, the economic problems encountered by the South 
following the Civil War led to the repeal of the federal bankruptcy 
legislation.12 
2.2 British Insolvency: Slow Escape from the Debt 
Stigmata  
During period between the passing of the Statute of Anne and the 
commencement of hostilities with the American colonies, Britain 
also had developments in its bankruptcy system, but in a fashion that 
focussed on maximising the returns to creditors rather than 
alleviating the burden of debtors to any significant degree. In 1732, a 
consolidating act13 was passed that became the statutory basis for 
bankruptcy law for the rest of the eighteenth century. As the 
eighteenth century progressed, the number of insolvencies increased, 
revealing weaknesses in the system illuminated by the burden placed 
upon it.14  
Throughout the nineteenth century, insolvency law in the UK evolved 
in order to avoid fraudulent activities common in the earlier regimes. 
                                                                                                                 
1843); The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Act of Mar 2, 1867, ch 176, 14 Stat 517 
(repealed 1878). 
11 Act of Jun 22, 1874, ch 390, 18 Stat 178 (amending and supplementing an act 
entitled “an act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United 
States). 
12 Lubben, above note 1, 377. 
13 An Act Preventing the Committing of Frauds by Bankrupts 1732 (5 Geo 2 c 30).  
14 V.M. Lester, Victorian Insolvency (1995, Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp. 
18-21. 
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While laissez-faire economics was the preferred approach during this 
period, government intervention15 was justified due to the growing 
influence of the business community,16 particularly following the 
introduction of the joint-stock companies.17 While an early 
composition procedure was also available,18 the stigma associated 
with debt and bankruptcy remained resilient, as well as the focus on 
creditors.19 The focus on fault and creditor satisfaction indicates a 
close tie to the prevailing moral perception of bankrupts and the 
Victorian values of thrift, self-help, and individual effort.20 
A number of Acts21 introduced and reinforced modern concepts 
of insolvency, such as the statutory regime for preferential 
debts; the pari passu principle; separate judicial and 
administrative functions; and the public examination of those at 
fault for creditor losses.22  Some of these were influenced by the 
recognition that some species of public good was both desirable 
and could be achieved by providing a means of collective action 
in the liquidation and distribution of bankrupt estates.23 
However, the quantity of bankruptcy reforms during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century resulted in layers of law 
that were difficult to operate and prone to manipulation and 
                                                 
15 Bankruptcy Court (England) Act 1831 (1 & 2 Will 4 c 56). 
16 Lester, above note 14, pp. 40-48. 
17 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7&8 Vict c 110); a winding-up was introduced 
at the same time in the Act Facilitating the Winding Up of Affairs of Joint Stock 
Companies Unable to Meet Their Pecuniary Engagements 1844 (7&8 Vict c111). 
18 Bankrupts (England) Act 1825 (6 Geo 4 c16). 
19 Lester, above note 14, 21-37 & 53-64. 
20 R. Bellamy, Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth Century Political Thought and 
Practice (1988, Routledge, London), p. 7. 
21 The Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act 1844 (7&8 Vict c111); Bankruptcy 
Act 1883 (46&47 Vict c52); Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4&5 Geo 5 c59); and The 
Companies Act (25 & 26 Vict c89).  
22 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, Student edn, (2005, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London) 6-9 and Lester, above note 14, p. 227. 
23 Lester, above note 14, pp. 293-294. 
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would attract the attention of reformers in the 1970s,24 but it 
would not be until the Insolvency Act of 1986 that a true species 
of corporate rescue would be legislated,25 partly due to the 
desire of the UK to join the European Community.26  
The Cork Report preceded the passage of the Insolvency Act 
1986.27  An entirely new approach and perception of the aims of 
insolvency law in the UK was adopted, including a truly social 
message that was recommended to be incorporated in the 
imminent reforms.28 The Cork Report recognised and 
formulated the concept of a rescue culture, stating that given 
that the failure of commercial enterprises has wide 
repercussions for a variety of stakeholders, including but not 
limited to creditors, shareholders, employees, suppliers, and 
others who would be adversely affected by business failure. A 
legitimate aim of insolvency laws should be to have concern for 
the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an 
enterprise.29 In the view of Cork Committee, the rescue culture 
would manifest itself in policies directed at the more benevolent 
treatment of insolvent legal entities as well as the more 
draconian treatment of the unscrupulous abusers of the system. 
It would also mean the steady removal of the stigmatising effect 
of bankruptcy.30 Though beneficent in their view of what the 
future should hold for insolvency, the Cork Committee’s more 
socially oriented recommendations would not find immediate 
                                                 
24 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, 2nd edn 
(2009, CUP, Cambridge), pp. 12-13. 
25 1986 c 45 (hereafter referred to as the IA1986); M. Hunter, “The Nature and 
Functions of the Rescue Culture” (1999) November JBL 426, p. 455. 
26 Hereafter referred to as the “EC”. 
27 Hunter, above note 25. 
28 K. Cork, Sir (Chairman), Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review 
Committee (Cmnd 8558 1982) ch 4 para 203-204. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Hunter, above note 25, p. 26. 
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implementation, however, more recent reforms31 as well as the 
influence of the EU have seen many of the social objectives of 
insolvency law incorporated into the British insolvency system, 
including a preference for rescue over simple liquidation.32   
The changes made to insolvency law in the last fifteen years 
demonstrate that the policy of corporate rescue is now being 
given precedence over traditional creditor wealth maximisation 
and debt recovery.33 Rescue strategies supported by the current 
legislation are based upon a utilitarian approach, predicated on 
the premise that the interests of the few are outweighed by the 
needs of the many. The interests represented now also include 
the wider community, as well as social and political objectives 
of full employment. These interests can often be better served 
though the rescue of a business than asset realisations followed 
by pari passu distributions of what remains after secured 
creditors and liquidators are paid their share.34 
2.3 The American Way: A Constitutional Conundrum 
The presence of the Bankruptcy Clause in the American Constitution 
crossed with the existence of a myriad of State authored bankruptcy 
laws caused a number of problems for state courts. Some held 
insolvency codes to be unconstitutional, on the interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Clause as having left Congress with the sole power to 
legislate in this area. Focused on the existence of the discharge, it 
was held that  
“a law discharging a debtor from his debts, without 
payment, if not a bankrupt law, is a law impairing the law 
                                                 
31 The Enterprise Act 2002 c 40 (hereafter referred to as the “EA”). 
32 See the Insolvency Act 1986 sch B1 para 3. 
33 D. Milman, “Moratoria on Enforcement Rights: Revisiting Corporate Rescue” 
(2004) March/April Conveyancer and Property Law Journal 89, p. 104. 
34 Ibid.  
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of contracts, the power of making which is, by the said 
Constitution, expressly forbidden to individual states.”35  
Thus it was not only the Bankruptcy Clause, the ignoring of which 
was beginning to create uncertainty, but also implicated the Contracts 
Clause, given the effect on contracts that a discharge post-bankruptcy 
would have. By allowing a discharge, bankruptcy law was viewed as 
interfering with the integrity of contracts by facilitating a breach in 
discharging the obligation to pay the full consideration agreed by the 
contracting parties.36  
The constitutionality of state authored bankruptcy law was assessed 
in Sturges v Crownshield37 in 1819. Crownshield sought relief by 
way of bankruptcy and discharge under the New York statute. It was 
argued by his creditor that the Bankruptcy Clause prevented states 
from legislating in this area and that, therefore, the New York statue 
and the discharge it afforded was unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court failed to state definitively the position of state insolvency law 
with regard to the Bankruptcy Clause; rather, the Court inferred a 
broader reading of the Clause, ruling that the states had the power to 
legislate in this area in the absence of Congressional action, and that 
such laws would be constitutional as long as they were not applied to 
contracts arising prior to the promulgation of the law.38 By not 
weighing in definitively on what likely should have been the federal 
nature of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Clause of the US 
Constitution, the Supreme Court allowed the States to take the 
ambiguous judgment in Crownshield and apply it to their own 
bankruptcy cases with an extraordinarily diverse effect, creating a 
great deal of uncertainty in relation to the applicability and 
                                                 
35 Olden v Hallet 4 NLJ 466, 469 (NJ 1819). 
36 Lubben, above note 1, 349-350. 
37 Sturges v Crownshield 17 US (4 Wheat) 122 (1819). 
38 Lubben, above note 1, 352-353. 
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effectiveness of bankruptcy laws among the states, as well as the 
validity of any discharges that were given.39  
State insolvency laws met their end in the final years of the 
nineteenth century with the passing of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.40 
The Act was a clear break from the English inspired, creditor 
controlled systems that were tried earlier in the century, providing  
discharge post liquidation and the option of compositions with 
creditors. When challenged in the Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy 
Clause finally left dormancy as bankruptcy became the province of 
the federal government.41 Its boundaries were tested in the 1930s and 
corporate reorganisations were federalised in the Chandler Act. 
Following the Act, a group of specialised bankruptcy professionals 
developed, who would be important characters for the procedures 
introduced in the 1978 Act when the referees under the previous act 
became bankruptcy judges.42 
3 Aims of Insolvency: An Anglo-American Rift 
American Bankruptcy Law evolved following the Revolution in a 
piecemeal fashion among individual states with a focus on how to 
provide relief for debtors while also treating creditors as fairly as 
possible under the circumstances. A Maryland bankruptcy statue 
encapsulates the concept of discharge:  
“The great principle upon which it is founded, is, that the 
debtor shall surrender all his property for the common 
benefit of all his creditors. He can only obtain his 
discharge on complying with this requisite, and some 
                                                 
39 Joshua M. Van Cott, “A General Bankrupt Law” (1841) 4 Merchant’s Magazine 
and Commercial Review 22.  
40 Act of July 1, 1898, Ch 541 30 Stat 544 (repealed 1978); SJ Lubben, “A New 
Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause” (2013) 64(2) Case Western Reserve Law 
Review 319, 383-384. 
41 Lubben, above note 1, 388-389. 
42 Cent Va Cmty Coll v Katz, 546 US 356, 373 (2006). 
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others of an inferior nature. When he has complied, then 
he is entitled to his discharge.”43 
The idea of a “fresh start” attracted dozens of bankrupts to apply to 
the court in Baltimore. Further, the concept of a fresh start is a 
fundamental characteristic of the modern American bankruptcy 
system. It was recognised that it was important for the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the country that relief should be made available to honest but 
unfortunate debtors.44 Thus the purpose of bankruptcy in the 
American system has evolved with the foundational principle of 
aiding the unfortunate but honest debtor.45  
English bankruptcy was quite different due to the historic 
relationship with debt which characterised debtors as anti-social and 
immoral by causing difficulty for one’s creditors and failing to adhere 
to bargains struck. While the unforgiving nature of English 
bankruptcy law has changed over time to a degree, financial failure is 
still considered a character weakness and business failure is generally 
an embarrassment.46 The opposing character of American bankruptcy 
law could be attributed to the draconian treatment of debtors in the 
English legal system. A large proportion of settlers in the eighteenth 
century were convicts who had been imprisoned for debt, so it is not 
surprising that the American approach to bankruptcy would be 
potentially quite different from the old country.  In addition, the 
nature of economic growth in America had to be rapid in order to 
cope with competing industrialising nations in Europe; as such, early 
bankruptcy laws had the flavour of promoting commerce, which 
meant encouraging entrepreneurialism and the risk taking that was 
inherently associated with it.47 Debt forgiveness was therefore critical 
to a strong American economy.48 
                                                 
43 In Re Stewart, 2 Am LJ 184, 186 (Md Ch 1809). 
44 In Re Brown, 1 Mart (os) 158, 159 (Orleans 1810). 
45 Stellwagen v Clum, 245 US 605, 617 (1918). 
46 N. Martin, “Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences” 
(2003) 11 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 367, pp. 371-374. 
47 Ibid, p 370. 
48 Ibid., p. 403. 
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There is also a cultural aspect of the American people that helps to 
explain the focus on debt forgiveness and reorganisation over 
liquidation and punishment. Money and consumerism are particularly 
strong forces in American society. Losing money equates to losing 
independence and independence is a fundamental facet of the 
American psyche.49 In addition, business failure is often viewed as a 
product of misfortune rather than wrong doing. Given the pioneering 
character of the US historically, risk-taking is expected and 
respected, while creditors are at times perceived as being greedy.50 
The Chapter 11 procedure today continues to adhere to aims of 
rescue and reorganisation over liquidation with the debtor-friendly 
aspect of early bankruptcy laws evident in the “debtor in possession” 
nature of the procedure. Reorganisation has been prioritised  because 
it was viewed that allowing assets to be utilised as intended with the 
benefit of preserving jobs was preferred over the destruction of 
valuable firm specific assets.51 Thus not only is the old focus on 
discharge still present, which places the plight of the honest debtor 
ideologically above the position of creditors, but the focus on rescue 
over liquidation is clear in the preference that managers often have 
for the former given the presumption favouring the continued control 
of management. The structure of the procedure provides an incentive 
for managers given the latitude corporate debtors have regarding the 
treatment of creditors and the fact that the managers can control what 
is done with that freedom.52 The underpinning philosophy is to 
balance the desires of creditor and debtor groups while promoting 
commerce, which was not aligned with the English system’s 
                                                 
49 G. McCormack, “Control and Corporate Rescue – an Anglo-American 
Evaluation” (2007) 56(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 515, p. 
525. 
50 G. Moss, “Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or Liquidations? 
Comparisons of Trends in National Law—England” (1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 115. 
51 M. Bradley and M. Rosenwig, “The Untenable Case for Chapter 11” (1992) 
101(5) The Yale Law Journal 1043, pp. 1043-1044. 
52 Ibid., 1045 
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unforgiving and highly administrative bankruptcy process.53 It did 
not take long to shed the stigma of the more punitive English system.  
Prior to the introduction of the concept of corporate rescue in the 
United Kingdom, the purpose of insolvency was based primarily on a 
collective regime aimed at achieving the best possible outcome for 
creditors.54 The purpose of insolvency law was predicated on the 
assumption that if a company encounters financial difficulty, it is 
probably due to the failure of management. Thus, unlike the 
American system, it is viewed as contrary to the aims of insolvency 
to allow the management to retain control.55 Further, the British 
system tends to favour financiers as bankers seem to have acquired 
respectability while entrepreneurs who take business risks have not.56 
The English judiciary also tend to be inclined to be sympathetic to 
insolvency practitioners rather than debtors as practitioners are 
professionals known to the court, whereas the debtor’s fall into 
insolvency tends to be treated as a basis for suspicion.57   
Although insolvency law has traditionally aimed to satisfy more 
economic interests in the UK, issues of fairness have now been 
accepted as necessary considerations in the UK insolvency system. 
Among these considerations are the ranking of wages as preferential 
debts, access to social security for repayment of arrears, rules dealing 
with continuity of employment, and laws stipulating the mandatory 
transfer of contracts on the transfer of a business as a going 
concern.58 In this area, the UK has expanded beyond the social 
considerations taken in relation to corporate rescue than has the US, 
which is again influenced by the constitutional and legal history of 
both jurisdictions, as well as the approach to social policy that each 
country takes. It is to the concept of social policy as it relates to 
insolvency that this paper now turns.  
                                                 
53 Martin, above note 46, pp. 367-368. 
54 Goode, above note 22, p. 5. 
55 McCormack, above note 49, p. 522. 
56 Moss, above note 50. 
57 McCormack, above note 49, p. 525. 
58 Finch, above note 24, p.15. 
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4 Employees in Insolvency: Issues of Job Security and 
Social Policy 
From its peak following the New Deal era,59 much of the welfare 
state programmes have been retrenched in the US with policy 
changes that either cut social expenditure, restructure welfare state 
programs to conform more closely to the residual welfare state 
model, or alter the political environment in ways that enhance the 
probability of such outcomes in the future.60 In addition, social policy 
retrenchment is highly path dependent, thus social policy choices 
tend to create strong vested interests and expectations, which are 
difficult to dislodge. As the risks have risen due to increased income 
inequality, growing instability of income over time, increased 
employment in less structured services and part time roles, and 
increased structural unemployment, social protections have been 
eroded rather than enhanced.61 The US has an uneasy partnership 
with welfare state ideals. The purpose of welfare considerations 
undermines that central theme of independence and the individual 
responsibility that is connected to it. This approach to matching 
reforms to social changes is also evident in the American approach to 
employment issues arising out of corporate rescue. 
While the UK tends toward a modest liberal market ideology, its 
welfare state model tends to be far more progressive than the US 
model. Among most welfare states apart from the US, core 
programmes are broadly cherished, rather than regarded with 
suspicion.62 However, the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis 
precipitated a review of such programmes throughout the world’s 
                                                 
59 The New Deal was a series of federal programs, public works projects, and 
financial reforms and regulations enacted in the United States during the 1930s in 
response to the Great Depression. 
60 P. Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State (1995,CUP, Cambridge), p. 17. 
61 J.S. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden 
Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States” (2004) 98(2) The 
American Political Science Review 243, pp. 245-249. 
62 B. Vis, K. van Kersbergen and T. Hylands, “To What Extent Did the Financial 
Crisis Intensify the Pressure to Reform the Welfare State” (2011) 45(4) Social 
Policy & Administration 338, p. 341. 
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welfare states, including the UK. A number of social protections have 
been undermined, including employment protection and job security, 
despite public outcry and resistance. In fact, public support for the 
welfare state has increased following the crises, despite mounting 
financial constraints that have limited the extent to which 
governments can meet such demands. The UK, however, has scaled 
back far more welfare support than has its European counterparts,63 
though the nature of social policy remains far more central and 
important in the UK than the position it occupies in the US.   
4.1 Social Policy and Insolvency in the United States: A 
Dire WARNing 
Until World War I, State law was the primary source of employment 
law, but these regulatory frameworks were heavily tempered by the 
concept of individual liberty. State laws generally tended to uphold 
rights to freely enter contracts for the hiring of services.64 The 
American employment system is thus characterised by the concept of 
“at-will” employment in which employers possessed the legal 
authority to determine unilaterally the terms and conditions of an 
employment relationship.65 This rule gained the ultimate authority in 
1908 when the Supreme Court provided a constitutional basis for the 
doctrine.66 Essentially the doctrine means that both the employer and 
employee are engaged in a relationship that is at the will of either of 
them, thus the employee can leave at any time and the employer can 
dismiss him, unless there is a contractual provision in place to the 
contrary.67  The at will doctrine is universally accepted in the US, 
having been described as the “very foundation of the free enterprise 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 342. 
64 C.A. Scott, “Money Talks: The Influence of Economic Power on the 
Employment Laws and Policies in the United States and France” (2006) 7 San 
Diego Int’l LJ 341, pp. 350-351. 
65 S.F. Befort, “Labour and Employment Law at the Millennium: a Historical 
Review and Critical Assessment” (2001) 43 B C L Rev 460, pp. 355-375. 
66 Adair v United States, 208 US 161 (1908).   
67 Scott, above note 64,  351. 
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system.”68 Some states have enacted legislation placing limitations 
on the at-will doctrine; however, broadly speaking it is still in 
place.69 The lack of employment protection for American workers is 
not helped by the lack of federal power to control social policy in this 
area in any fundamental way due to the fact that contract law, of 
which employment law is a subset, is governed by individual state 
legal systems.  
While the Bankruptcy Clause provides the US Federal Government 
with the power to legislate in relation to insolvency and corporate 
rescue,70 the same does not apply to contract law and other domestic 
state concerns. Certain rights are now guaranteed for employees in 
the US, but these rights do not derive from any specific constitutional 
article or amendment implementing social policy objectives on a 
federal level. Rather, they derive from various articles and 
amendments to the Constitution that have been used to justify their 
existence. Notably, employee rights such as minimum wage, working 
hours, health and safety, equal pay, and even civil rights issues such 
as affirmative action71 have been justified as being covered by the 
Commerce Clause,72 which allows the federal government to regulate 
business conducted across state lines. There is also a “necessary and 
proper” clause providing Congress with a significant degree of 
flexibility in the invocation of its enumerated powers, though this 
flexibility has been continuously mitigated by a focus on the 
                                                 
68 D.B. Shine, “An Analysis of the Terms and Level of Implementation of the 
European Union’s Collective Dismissal Directive and the United States WARN 
ACT. Another Example for the European Union on the Relative Merits of Political 
Federation over Confederation” (1998) 12 Fla J Int’l L 183, p. 185. 
69 Known as “whistle-blowing” in the UK which as a reason for discharge is now 
prohibited in a number of American states; see Befort, above note 65, 385-393. 
70 Article 1 Section 8 Clause 4 states that Congresses enumerated powers include 
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subject of bankruptcies throughout the US. 
71 Although the groundwork for these were laid by the 13th amendment abolishing 
slavery, the 14th amendment prohibiting discrimination in the right to vote based on 
race and the 15th amendment giving women the right to vote laid the groundwork 
for these laws. 
72 Article 1 Section 8 of the Preamble to the US Constitution 
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limitations on the federal government set out with some specificity in 
the Constitution.73 The context of US social policy thus differs 
significantly from EU social policy, which figures quite prominently 
in most Member States through the implementation of social policy 
directives having legal basis set out in the Social Chapter of the EU 
Treaty. 
Although there are certain employee rights available under Chapter 
11, these do not always adequately protect employees who might be 
subject to drastic reductions in the workforce, pensions and other 
employee benefits. As these are not protected in any way by statute, 
and in the absence of any protection from collective agreements, 
employees may get notification of redundancies but will essentially 
just have to suffer the loss of their jobs and associated benefits. These 
drastic reductions often occur at the beginning of a reorganisation 
process, which is then sometimes followed by the payment of 
massive retention bonuses to upper management in order to keep 
them “on the job.”74 Thus, there is often a great divide between the 
treatment of managers as opposed to workers and employees in the 
context of Chapter 11 restructurings.75 In addition, collective 
agreements and employment contracts can be summarily terminated 
under the Bankruptcy Code.76 The persistence of the “at will” 
doctrine means that employees in these situations will have recourse 
to legal protection in only limited circumstances. 
                                                 
73 Redish, above note 6, p. 604. 
74 See for example Re Eastman Kodak Co. et al, Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy, Case No 12-10202, So, Dist. NY (2012) available from 
http://bankrupt.com/misc/Kodak_StipSpectra073013.pdf accessed 30 October 
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75 J. Berry, “Different Playing Fields: What Affect Does Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
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76 P.A. Susser, A.M. Weber and S.J. Friedman, “Employment and Employee 
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Employee claims occurring prior to the petition for Chapter 11 rank 
fourth in priority under the US Bankruptcy Code and are limited in 
time and amount.77 While such claims carry priority, this is only after 
administrative expenses and secured claims have been paid.78 
Following the petition for bankruptcy, those employees that have 
been assumed by the debtor are assured of being paid for services 
rendered during the reorganisation. These rank as an administrative 
expense and are given first priority, though it is rare that such a claim 
will arise as a debtor will be sure to continue to pay such 
administrative debts as they fall due or risk not completing 
reorganisation. 79 In any event, while priority exists, it falls short of 
the priority given to employees in similar situations in EU countries 
as employees with pre-petition claims essentially rank equally with 
unsecured creditors and are limited in time and amount claimable. 
In terms of the employment protection regulation available to 
employees during the insolvency of their employer, the “at-will” 
doctrine continues to apply in the United States. An employee does 
not have the right to be transferred with a business to which he is 
associated and if he is, there is no continuity of employment between 
the previous employer and the new one. Essentially, this relies on 
basic laws of contract that once governed the whole of employment 
law in the UK, though this is now mitigated by employment 
protection regulation aimed at correcting the power imbalance in the 
employment relationship. There are no statutory notice periods, 
requirements for severance, or redundancy pay, or procedural 
requirements for dismissal. For any of these to apply, they would 
have to be included in a collective agreement or perhaps an employee 
handbook.  Employers can lay-off employees for any reason that does 
                                                 
77 Pensions refers only to retirement income while welfare benefits refer to medical, 
health, accident, disability or death benefits, severance pay, training, apprenticeship 
programmes, day care and prepaid legal services. 
78 P.M. Secunda, “An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and Wage 
Claims in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries: 
Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the US” (2014) XLI Fordham Urban 
Law Journal 867, 898 and D R Korobkin, “Employee Interests in Bankruptcy” 
(1996) 4 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 5, pp. 8-9. 
79 Korobkin, above note 78, pp. 14-15. 
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not violate anti-discrimination statutes or that constitute an act of bad 
faith.80   
There are some limited protections available to employees affected 
by an employer’s insolvency. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act,81 a statute requiring advance notice if collective 
redundancies were envisaged, was passed to mitigate some of the 
issues surrounding large scale bankruptcies.82 If the WARN Act is 
engaged, the employer must provide written notice to representatives 
and employees affected by the action. The WARN Act applies to 
business enterprises of a certain size and composition in the event of 
a mass layoff,83 however, the threshold for a mass layoff is relatively 
high compared to the Collective Redundancies Directive. The 
WARN Act does not require consultation, merely 60 days advance 
notice in employers having over 100 employees, though it excludes 
several categories of workers, including those engaging in collective 
action at the time of the notice.84 There is also no provision for 
transferring employment contracts. Employees will only transfer if 
the transferee formally offers them employment and continuity of 
employment is not guaranteed.85 Compared with the protections 
available to employees affected by the insolvency of their employer 
in the UK and other EU countries, the WARN Act merely recognises 
that employees are affected, but offers very little in terms of real 
security or protection. This is where the protections provided to 
American employees in the event of an insolvency ends.  
4.2 Social Policy and Insolvency in the United Kingdom: 
An EU Imperative 
                                                 
80 Susser, Weber and Friedman, above note 76. 
81 An Act to require advance notification of plant closings and mass layoffs, and for 
other purposes (the “WARN” Act) enacted by the 100th United States Congress, 
Pub. L. 100-379 102 Stat 890. 
82 Susser, Weber and Friedman, above note 76. 
83 Scott, above note 64,  pp. 373-374. 
84 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to collective redundancies. 
85 Scott, above note 76, p. 377. 
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The British employment relationship is based on a ‘master and 
servant’ model connected to the early legal form of social relations, 
which was a statutory and hierarchical paradigm rather than 
contractual and common law. The master and servant form of 
employment relationship relied upon a command relation with an 
open ended duty of obedience imposed on the worker, reserving far-
reaching disciplinary powers to the employer.86 Even once the 
employment relationship had been given contractual status, imposing 
certain civil obligations, the hierarchical characteristic of the 
traditional master and servant model has been carried over into the 
modern contractual employment relationship to some extent.87  Legal 
terminology and the old assumptions of unmediated control 
continued to be applied by the courts as they developed the common 
law of employment. The advent of the welfare state and the extension 
of collective bargaining caused employment law to change direction, 
but the traditional hierarchy of employer and employee remained 
difficult to dislodge from the British legal psyche.88  While this has 
been tempered since the 1940s and given legal status following the 
introduction of the Employment Rights Act of 1996, as well as other 
more progressive employment oriented legislation, the master and 
servant approach is still evident in Britain’s regulatory approach to 
employment law.89 This has been displaced to some extent by the 
application of EU law through a number of social policy directives. 
After decades of slow but progressive changes to employment rights 
and protections within the EU, all Member States are now bound by 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights90 and the Social Chapter of 
                                                 
86 S. Deakin and W. Njoya, “The Legal Framework of Employment Relations” 
(2007) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper no. 
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87 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, “The Social Charter in Britain: Labour Law and 
Labour Courts?” (1991) 54(1) MLR 35, p. 6. 
88 Deakin and Njoya, above note 86, p. 7. 
89 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, above note 87, p. 6. 
90 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ 2000/C 364/1 of 18 
December 2000. 
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the EU Treaty,91 with some narrow derogative options.92 However, 
EU social policy remains within the domain of Member States to 
determine, requiring unanimous decision making in legislative 
proposals falling under its definition.93 As social institutions are 
deeply embedded in each country’s larger societal framework and 
history, they cannot be easily aligned94 as can be seen by the diverse 
ways in which social policy related directives are implemented in 
Member States.   
The approach to social policy differs significantly from the more 
closely coordinated action taken by the EU in matters of insolvency. 
The cooperation of European countries in matters of insolvency has a 
long history. The project has been in progress for over 40 years 
within the EU, evolving in complexity and increasing in cooperation 
as the EU has expanded and changed.95  The culmination of this 
cooperation was the EU Insolvency Regulation.96 While this does not 
implement an EU wide insolvency system, the aims and outcomes of 
corporate rescue mechanisms throughout the EU do not have the 
same variance that social policy regulation does.  This could be 
explained by the fact that insolvency, as a corporate law matter, has a 
more international influence given the globalised marketplace in 
which most businesses now exist. A closer alignment of insolvency 
mechanisms is logical, therefore, as it makes cross-border business 
less complicated. This may also explain the EU approach to a cross-
border insolvency regulation, rather than trying to implement an EU 
wide insolvency system. There is perhaps a more natural tendency to 
                                                 
91 The Treaty on European Union OJ C/191/01of 29 July 1992 (the Maastricht 
Treaty). 
92 The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the provisions of the Social Chapter 
directly in 1997. 
93 N. Esenturk, “EU Social Policy: Progressive Development in Legal and 
Governance Aspects” (2010) UK Social Policy Association <http://www.social-
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align systems that are forced to interact regularly in the common and 
international markets.97 
This same idea can explain to a certain extent why it is that Member 
State employment regulations have not seen the same kind of 
convergence or direct regulation by the EU. Workers are generally 
less mobile with the consequence that differences in preferences can 
lead to differences in employment law systems. Also, the political 
context of business versus labour is specifically a domestic concern; 
as such, the conflicting pressure may steer different countries in 
different directions.98 This also offers justification for legislating in 
this area with directives, which are binding only as to the result to be 
achieved. There are a number of EU directives that serve to further 
preserve employment and workers’ rights in insolvency situations in 
relation to collective redundancies,99 transfers of undertakings100  and 
state guarantee funds for employee wages and other compensation.101  
Member States have taken varied approaches to the implementation 
of these directives102 as derogations are available that have been 
                                                 
97 See M. Siems, “Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection: Time Series 
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implemented differently among the Member States owing to the 
endogenous factors of culture, legal tradition and domestic social 
policy.103 While social policy directives and their implementation 
among Member States provide a minimum level of protection for 
employees affected by their employer’s insolvency, the position 
following the financial crisis has seen a retrenchment of social policy 
issues throughout the EU. 
In the UK there are a number of protections in place for employees 
affected by the insolvency of their employer. While employees are 
still generally considered unsecured creditors of the employer with 
the usual rights of a normal contracting party,104 their position is 
protected in relation to up to four months wages occurring prior to 
the insolvency, ranking as a preferential debt subject to a maximum 
amount of £800, an amount set in 1986105 and, to date, unchanged. 
Employee claims beyond the preferred portion rank equally to that of 
other unsecured creditors. An employee also has the right to claim 
some amounts due from the Secretary of State, which is paid out of 
the National Insurance Fund.106 In the event the business continues, 
an insolvency practitioner steps into the role of the employer and 
must deal with the adopted employment contracts appropriately. 
Where the business is sold, provisions apply that will transfer 
employment contracts to the purchaser.107 This was a huge change for 
the UK system, which relied on a fundamental value of freedom of 
contract. The first UK legislation conferring continuity of 
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employment on a business transfer108 only applied if the employees 
were voluntarily retained by the purchasing firm. There was no 
concept of automatic transfer as this would conflict with the 
fundamental freedom of contract.109     
In terms of dismissals associated with corporate rescue procedures, 
there are a number of protections in place. Unfair dismissal 
legislation110 generally will protect employees from dismissals that 
have not been justified if an employee has worked at an 
establishment for at least two years. Redundancy111 is also regulated, 
which is the most likely method of dismissal to occur in the event of 
an employer’s insolvency. Like unfair dismissal, an employee must 
also have two years of continuous employment. If eligible, then 
employees may also be due a statutory redundancy payment112 
calculated according to the length of time an employee has worked 
for the employer. In the event of collective redundancies, the 
Collective Redundancies Directive113 may apply, which requires 
consultation and information obligations provided to employees by 
the employer. Thus there are a number of provisions available to 
employees affected by the insolvency of their employer, unlike the 
limited protections available under the US system.  
5 Constitutional Matters: Bankruptcy and Social Policy – a 
Question of Federalism? 
The UK and US have developed insolvency and social policy 
regulation in a fairly opposing manner. Despite the fact that parallels 
are often drawn between the UK and the US due to their generally 
shared views of a neo-liberal economy, the underpinning 
philosophies that inform regulatory choices are diametrically 
opposing. This can be attributed to the staid and steady UK culture 
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109 Baker and Smith, above note 106, p. 541. 
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and history juxtaposed against the fast growing, risk taking, and 
pioneering spirit that formed the backbone of the US. The American 
spirit of entrepreneurialism and independence continues today and is 
evident in its approach to both insolvency and social policy. The 
independence factor tends to both impede progress in the area of 
social policy due to the suspicion with which any paternalistic 
activism is viewed, while the same independence has imbued itself in 
the US insolvency system by making it possible for debtors to be 
freed from the shackles of debt without the same stigma that often 
accompanies debt discharge in the UK. Seeking to balance the 
earnest businessman’s need to take risks to capture economic 
progress with the need to satisfy the obligations owed to creditors 
under contract law, the US created a system that allowed for 
bankruptcy discharge and an emphasis on rescue and restructuring. 
These aspects of the American culture are deeply imbedded in its 
history, colouring much of the policies still held today.  
Applying in a shallow manner the theory of path dependence to the 
social policy of the US, it is clear that given the American emphasis 
on individuality and independence, and the restrictions that it has 
created in relation to offering more robust protections to individuals 
who find themselves in difficulty due to their employers’ insolvency 
or other aspect of the lack of job security that is generally 
characteristic of the American employment market, it is clear that 
without some kind of “revolutionary” change, incremental changes 
are unlikely to achieve any significant shifts in relation to the 
protections available in such circumstances. While progressive ideas 
have recently found their way into common discourse, particularly in 
light of the current political debate, it remains uncertain whether the 
current system of governance is equipped to deal with such 
fundamental changes. The path dependent obstacles standing in the 
way of change in this area may require a federal approach that is 
potentially unachievable given the lack of firm constitutional basis to 
make unilateral change in the area of social policy. A similar 
structure can be observed in the way that social policy matters tend to 
be left to the prevue of the Member States of the EU, however, 
despite this fact, it appears that the EU has been able to influence 
Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law 
individual states in a far more significant manner than the US has for 
the States. However, it is questionable whether such intervention is 
something that is within the ideological capacity of the American 
system in any event.  
While the power of the US Federal Government to legislate with 
regard to bankruptcy law forms a part of the very first Article of the 
Constitution, any federal intervention in labour or employment have 
had to find their justification in clauses and amendments that may or 
may not provide enough muster to pass Supreme Court analysis.  
This seems directly opposed to the way in which insolvency and 
social policy are regulated within the EU. The European Insolvency 
Regulation only goes so far as to regulate in matters of cross-border 
insolvencies, leaving member state procedures autonomous, while 
the social chapter has given the EU wide powers to legislate in 
matters of employment and labour regulation. While true that there 
the EU Commission has issued a recommendation introducing a new 
approach to business failure and insolvency that shifts the focus from 
liquidation to encouraging the early restructuring of viable 
businesses,114 this is merely exhortation and an invitation to reform, 
non-binding on the Member States. However, in areas of social 
policy, EU influence is far more heavily felt, despite the fact that 
legislation is only in the form of Directives, which are binding only 
to the achievement of the intended results. The constitutional 
framework of the EU also seems far more flexible than the US, 
having directly interfered with Member State sovereignty in the area 
of social policy through a number of directives requiring 
implementation.  
What, then, is the final analysis that provides a rationale for the 
foregoing investigation? Despite the fact that the US and the UK are 
in theory aligned in economic and social policy to a significantly high 
degree compared to the rest of the EU, their underpinning values vary 
due to historical influences that have created very different contexts 
of legal development. It has been said that the US and the UK are two 
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countries divided by a common language, but it seems that in terms 
of the philosophical foundations of both insolvency and social policy, 
in spite of an apparent cohesiveness, the truth of the matter is that the 
underpinning values vary to such an extent that they may not be 
reconcilable. This helps to explain why a debtor in possession model 
has not been tried in any meaningful way in the UK as it is contrary 
to the fault-based ideology underpinning insolvency theory. It 
explains why the at-will doctrine continues to find favour in the US 
among individuals, companies, and governmental organisations alike 
due to the focus on independence and freedom to contract. While in 
reality such freedom does not exist due to the imbalance in 
bargaining power in the employment relationship, the belief in 
freedom and independence is such that applying paternalistic 
employment policies, such as those present in the UK and throughout 
the EU, which provide basic job security and employee protection, 
would be unacceptable to many Americans.  
Even the more progressive nature of the Democratic party today 
tends to be tempered by some adherence to American values of 
independence and freedom, although the current climate is 
introducing extraordinary innovation that tempers those values with 
some social democratic ideas. The 2016 presidential election had the 
potential to break new ground that has the potential to dislodge some 
of the path dependent ideals that continue to inform both social 
policy and bankruptcy policy decisions, and the first year of the 
current presidency has seen significant attempts to “buck the trend” 
of progress. In a similar vein, the upcoming spectre of Brexit is 
raising serious questions about the direction that the UK will take in 
the future.  The direction taken will inevitably influence the path of 
the law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
